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I. Introduction 
 Should the right of secession be incorporated into modern constitutions? If so, how 
should the right be structured to respect the right of self-determination while still maintaining 
stability and territorial integrity? Can a constitutional provision on secession promote national 
unity and prevent human rights violations?  
The resolution of these questions could have a dramatic effect on the international 
community. Most secessionist movements are marked by violence, destruction, and 
retaliation.1 These violent movements are directly linked to the deaths of millions of people and 
to systematic human rights violations perpetuated by both the secessionist groups and the 
governments resisting them.2 Further, these movements are widespread, appearing in both 
developing countries (e.g. Burma & Ethiopia) and developed countries (e.g. Spain & the United 
Kingdom).3 Given the wide spread nature of secessionist movements, much research and 
debate has developed on who has a right to secession or how that right is or is not justified 
under international law. However, little has been done to develop a method to directly address 
secession within the domestic framework.  
The traditional view within democratic governments has been that democracy and 
secession cannot coincide. This idea was embodied in Lincoln’s Inauguration Address when he 
stated, “Plainly, the central idea of secession, is the essence of anarchy.”4 However, there has 
been a shift in modern judicial opinions, which recognize that democracy must acknowledge 
                                                          
1 David S. Siroky, Explaining Secession in The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, 45, 45 (Peter Radan, 
Aleksandar Pavkovic ed., 2011). 
2 Id. at 45 – 46. 
3 Id.at 46. 
4 President Abraham Lincoln, Inauguration Address, (Mar. 4, 1861) 
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the right to self-determination.5 This principle has been encompassed in several Constitutions, 
both old and new.6  
According the International Court of Justice, the right to self-determination has become 
“one of the essential principles of contemporary international law.”7 This right was 
incorporated into Article 1.2 of the United Nations Charter, which upholds the “respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.”8 The foundation of self-determination was best 
described in Principles 2 and 3 of the Atlantic Charter.9 In the Charter, President Roosevelt and 
Prime Minister Church Hill declared that “they desire to see no territorial changes that do not 
accord with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned”10 and “they will respect the 
right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live.”11 Espoused in 
this understanding of self-determination is the idea of external self-determination, or 
secession.12 External self-determination encompasses not only the right to autonomy within a 
                                                          
5 See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) 
Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, pp. 31 – 32, ¶52-53; 
Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1975, 12, 32 ¶ 54-59; East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, I.C.J. 
Reports 1995, 90, 102, ¶ 29 
6 1868 Const. of Lux., art. 37(5) (Lux.); La Constitution, 2012 Const. art. 167 § 1 (Belg.); 1994 Const. of the Fed. 
Democratic Republic of Eth., art. 39 (Eth.) 
7 East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1995, 90, 102, ¶ 29 
8 U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2. 
9 Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (MPEPIL online), Self-Determination, B.1.5 
http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e873 
10 The Atlantic Charter: Declaration of Principles issued by the President of the United States and the Prime 
Minister of the United Kingdom, U.S.-U.K., Principle Two, Aug. 14, 1941 
11 Id. Principle Three 
12 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation Among States in 
Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. A/RES/25/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970). 
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state, but also the creation of a new nation-state or the integration into another nation-state.13 
Under international law 
 Based on the above understanding of self-determination, this essay will attempt to 
provide a workable constitutional model that protects human and civil rights of minorities by 
including a provision allowing for secession. Part II will discuss the current approaches to 
secession found in various constitutions. This section will also attempt to provide an evaluation 
of the effects these approaches have on secession and domestic law. Part III puts forth the 
assertion that constitutionally recognized secession should be adopted in order to strengthen 
internal self-determination and domestic governance. Further, this section will provide a model 
for implementation of secession into modern constitutions. 
II. Constitutional Approaches To Secession 
 The concept of secession is as old as the nation-state, having been included in 
constitutions dating back to the 19th Century.14 Countries have taken one of three constitution 
approaches to secession. A few have embraced the principle and clearly outline how the 
principle should be approached within domestic law. On the other end of the spectrum are the 
countries that have denounced secession through constitutional provisions. Most countries fall 
in between, with an implied right or denial, which is not stated until the question is raised. 
a. Expressed 
                                                          
13 Salvatore Senese, External and Internal Self-Determination, Social Justice Vol. 16, No. 1 (Spring 1989) p. 19 – 25, 
p 19. 
14 1868 Const. of Lux., art. 37(5) (Lux.); La Constitution, 2012 Const. art. 167 § 1 (Belg.) 
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Under the expressed approach, some countries have clearly acknowledged the right to 
self-determination and provided a constitutional framework to reach this principle. This 
approach has been adopted by modern constitutions as well as much more established 
constitutions. At least 18 countries allow for secession within their constitutional framework. 
This essay will look at Belgium and Ethiopia in order to demonstrate how this right has been 
incorporated into constitutions since the 19th century. 
BELGIUM  
Belgium is one of the oldest nations with an expressed right to secession granted in 
their constitution. Originally joined with the Northern Netherlands (Holland) at the Congress of 
Vienna in 1815, however, Belgium declared independence in 1830 from the Netherlands.15 As a 
nation created through secession, Belgium realized the importance of self-determination and 
included a provision to ensure future Belgians would have the opportunity to exercise this 
right.16 Written in 1831, the Belgian Constitution provides that “cession, exchange or expansion 
of territory can only take place by virtue of a law.”17 Belgium developed into a federal state, 
comprised of three distinct regions, the Flemish Region, The Walloon Region, and the Brussels-
Capital Region.18 Each region has its own legislative and executive governing body.19 
                                                          
15 Christopher K. Connolly, Independence in Europe: Secession, Sovereignty, and the European Union, 24 Duke J. 
Comp. & Int'l L. 51, 62 (2013) 
16 Id. 
17 La Constitution, 2012 Const. art. 167 § 1 (Belg.) 
18 Belgian Federal Government, Portal Belgium Government, The Regions, Portal Belgian Government 
http://www.belgium.be/en/about_belgium/government/regions/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2014) 
19 Id. 
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Belgium currently faces a separatist movement from the Flemish region. However, the 
movement is mainly political, with no violence.20 While the divisions in Belgium are ethnic and 
linguistic, the separatist movement is based on economics rather than ethnic differences.21 The 
main effect this movement has had on Belgium is the inability to form a working coalition 
government.22  
At the creation of the monolingual regions, the Walloon region enjoyed economic 
dominance.23 However, through modernization and industrialization in the Flanders region, the 
Flemish GDP per capita has now surpassed that of France and Germany.24 Unfortunately, the 
Walloon region has not had such economic success, suffering from a declining coal and steel 
market, the region’s GDP is comparable only to some of the poorest regions of other European 
states.25 
This huge disparity in economic stability, coupled with the social and cultural differences 
of the two regions has lead Flanders to reconsider its position within Belgium.26 Beginning in 
2007, the Flemish have called for more autonomy.27 Aside from more autonomy, the biggest 
concern among the Flemish is the amount of economic support provided to the Walloon 
                                                          
20 Martin Euwema & Alain Verbeke, Negative and Positive Roles of Media in the Belgian Conflict: A Model for De-
Escalation, 93 Marq. L. Rev. 139, 149 (2009) 
21 Thomas Wagner-Nagy, “European Disintegration? Separatist Movements Across the Continent Are Gaining 
Momentum” Online: Peace and Conflict Monitor http://www.monitor.upeace.org/innerpg.cfm?id_article=1072 
(last viewed Dec. 10, 2014).  
22 Id.  
23 Euwema & Verbeke, supra note 20, at 143 
24 Id.  
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 150. 
27 Id. 
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region.28 Some see this as an execration towards de-integration, which given Belgium’s view of 
secession could lead to the peaceful creation of a new state. The continued decentralization of 
power in Belgium is effectively moving towards secession achieved in stages.29 
ETHIOPIA 
Much like Belgium, Ethiopia is a multiethnic federal republic made of ethnic and 
linguistic defined states.30 Apart from that, Ethiopia’s experiment with constitutional secession 
has not been as peaceful. Ethiopia is currently fighting against several separatist groups and the 
controlling political party is more concerned with maintaining the status quo than upholding 
the secession provision.31 
Ethiopia’s federal system is similar to the United States, in that each state has its own 
constitution and governing bodies. Also like the United States, the Ethiopian states reserve all 
powers not granted to the federal government.32 However, Ethiopia is unique in its approach to 
secession. The Constitution clearly endorses the right of self-determination through both 
internal and external means33. The right of secession empowers the “Nations, Nationalities, and 
Peoples” to either create new states or to secede from the nation.34 Further, the Constitution 
                                                          
28 Id. 
29 Susanna Mancini, Rethinking the Boundaries of Democratic Secession: Liberalism, Nationalism, and the Right of 
Minorities to Self-Determination, 6 Int’l. J. Const. L. 533, 580 (2008). 
30 1994 Const. of the Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., art. 46 (Eth.) 
31 Jure Vidmar, Democratic Statehood in International Law: The Emergence of New States in Post-Cold War 
Practice, 325 (Hart Publishing, 2012). 
32 1994 Const. of the Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., art. 52 (Eth.) 
33 1994 Const. of the Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., art. 39, 47 (Eth.) 
34 Id.  
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provides a democratic process for the realization of the right of self-determination.35 This 
process requires: 
1. When a demand for secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned; 
2. When the Federal Government has organized a referendum which must take place 
within three years from the time it received the concerned council's decision for 
secession; 
3. When the demand for secession is supported by a majority vote in the referendum; 
4. When the Federal Government will have transferred its powers to the Council of the 
Nation, Nationality or People who has voted to secede; and 
5. When the division of assets is effected in a manner prescribed by law.36 
Finally, the constitution defines “Nation, Nationality or people” as “a group of people who 
share a large measure of common culture or similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, 
belief in a common or related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an 
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.”37 During the three year period, the federal 
government and other regional governments can attempt to negotiate a solution short of 
secession.38 
                                                          
35 Id.  
36 Alem Habtu, Multiethnic Federalism in Ethiopia: A Study of the Secession Clause in the Constitution, 35 Publius 
313, 327-28 (2005). 
37 1994 Const. of the Fed. Democratic Republic of Eth., art. 39 (Eth.) 
38 Alem Habtu, supra note 36 at 329 
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 Why does Ethiopia have such a unique approach to secession? The current system of 
government and constitution were created after the overthrow of a military regime.39 That 
regime was toppled by strong ethno-nationalist organizations.40 Recognizing the dangers that 
ethno-nationalism can pose to a government, the framers decided to create a state based on 
ethnic pluralism.41 In fact, many of the ethno-nationalist groups would not have joined the new 
federation without this approach.42 
While this provision has never been used, there have been several separatist 
movements in Ethiopia. The first, and only successful movement was that of Eritrea, which 
voted for independence in 1993, under the auspices of the UN (Eritrea’s secession took place 
under a transitional government, before the constitution officially took effect).43 Currently, the 
Ethiopian government is battling several separatist groups that have been denied the right to 
implement this provision. Ethiopia’s ruling coalition, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF), was been accused of voting fraud, exclusion of political parties, and 
attempting to maintain control through its influence over satellite regional groups.44 The 
government’s commitment to self-determination has been called into question, and while the 
provision has “symbolic value”, “it is unlikely that any Ethiopian government would allow 
secession to take place.”45 
                                                          
39 Id. at 322 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 323 
42 Id. at 324 
43 Jure Vidmar, supra note 31 at  
44 Id. at 325 
45 Alem Habtu, supra note 36 at 313 
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b. Denied 
Some countries have decided that self-determination is not an inalienable right. These 
countries have included constitutional provisions forbidding secession. This approach has been 
adopted by many countries that have systematic human rights violations, discrimination, 
and/or totalitarian governments. This section will look at the Constitutions of China and 
Myanmar to illustrate this approach. 
CHINA 
China has a long history of fractured states fighting for power. Under the dynasties, 
rebellions and uprisings continuously threatened the unification of China. The 1931 
Constitution of the Chinese Soviet Republic recognized the right of self-determination of 
minorities in China46. Article 14 clearly stated that minorities “shall enjoy the full right to self-
determination, i.e. they may join the Union of Chinese Soviets or secede from it and form their 
own state47.” However, once the Communist Party officially controlled mainland China, this 
provision was lost. The first Constitution written under the People’s Republic of China in 1954 
removes the 1931 Article 14 right to self-determination. Instead, Article 3 of the 1954 
Constitution affirms China’s existence as a “unitary multinational state” of which the “national 
autonomous areas are inseparable” parts of the state.48  
                                                          
46 Anonymous, China and the Principle of Self-Determination of Peoples, 6 St. Antony's Int'l Rev. 1, 79, 79-102 
(2010).  
47 Xianfa art. 14, (1931) (China)  
48 Xianfa art. 3, (1954) (China) 
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To solidify the state’s view on secession and separatist movements, China’s 1982 
Constitution includes a prohibition against “any acts that undermine the unity of the 
nationalities or instigate their secession49.” This shift in theory has been linked to China’s claim 
over Tibet, the rejection of the Nationalist government running Taiwan, and other separatist 
movements within China.50 China’s refusal to recognize the right of secession and limits on self-
determination has created domestic instability and international friction. China currently faces 
uprisings from suffragists in Hong Kong and from Uyghur separatist in Xinjiang.  
Hong Kong, once under British control, is now a largely autonomous region. However, 
recent moves by China to limit the electoral power of the Hong Kong citizens has led to 
widespread protest. Following the announcement that the State would chose the candidates 
and then approve the winner of elections, protesters took to the streets to decry the decision.51 
Many of the protesters have claimed that the new process goes against universal suffrage and 
self-determination.52 In response, the Hong Kong government, following China’s guidance, has 
deployed thousands of police, using riot control tactics against the protesters.53 More recently, 
                                                          
49 Xianfa art. 4, (1982) (China)  
50 Anonymous, supra note 46 at 81. 
51 Alex Kleiderman, Khanim Javadova et al., As it Happened: Hong Kong Protests 29 September, BBC News (Sep. 29, 
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29405576 
52 Larry Ong, Umbrella Movement to ‘Shopping Revolution’: Interactive Timeline of the Occupy Protest Key Events, 
Epoch Times (last updated Dec. 3, 2014) http://m.theepochtimes.com/n3/1109920-umbrella-movement-to-
shopping-revolution-an-interactive-timeline-of-the-occupy-protests-key-events/ 
53 Id. 
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several businesses, some of which are aligned with a Chinese state-owned corporation, have 
filed and won injunctions against the protesters.54 
This restriction on self-determination has long been the reality in Xinjiang region. While 
the Constitution recognizes autonomous rule for many regions, it leaves the power to “annul 
those local regulations or decisions… that contravene the Constitution, the statutes, or the 
administrative rules and regulations.”55 The Uyghur are an Islamic, Turkic speaking people 
located in the Xinjiang province.56 This region has undergone growing oppression under the 
Chinese government’s war on separatist and terrorism.57 Following the September 11th attacks, 
China highlighted the Uyghur’s Islamic roots to justify its increased hostility towards the 
region.58 Under these policies, China does little to distinguish between political activist and 
terrorist.59 And as political activism continues to rise in the region, China continues to accuse 
activist, journalist, and scholars of terrorism in an attempt to suppress the separatist views.60 
BURMA 
                                                          
54 Anonymous, Hong Kong Protests; What’s Changed at Mong Kok?, BBC News (last updated Dec. 3, 2014) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-29054196 
55 Xianfa art. 67 §8 (2008) (China) 
56 Amnesty International, Uyghur Ethnic Identity Under Threat in China, (ASA 17/010/2009), available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/ASA17/010/2009/en/e952496e-57bb-48eb-9741-
e6b7fed2a7d4/asa170102009en.pdf. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Dru C. Gladney, Response to Chinese Rule in Xinjiang: Patterns of Cooperation and Opposition, 10 The 
Mongolian Journal of International Affairs, 102 (2003) available at 
http://www.mongoliajol.info/index.php/MJIA/article/view/122. 
60 See, Amnesty International, Hasty Executions in China Highlight Unfair Xinjiang Trials (Nov. 10 2009) available at 
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/news/hasty-executions-china-highlight-unfair-xinjiang-trials-
20091110; See also, Preeti Bhattacharji, Council on Foreign Relations, Uighurs and China's Xinjiang Region, (May 
29, 2012) available at http://www.cfr.org/china/uighurs-chinas-xinjiang-region/p16870.  
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Much like the original Chinese Constitution, the first Constitution of Burma had an 
expressed guarantee of secession.61 This Constitution was written prior to the end of British 
colonial rule and was officially adopted in 1948, when Burma gained independence.62 Following 
the military takeover in 1973, a new Constitution was adopted in 1974.63 This Constitution 
omitted the right of secession and instead prohibited regions from undermining national unity 
or the stability of the State.64 The final Constitution, drafted under the military junta, expressly 
states that “no part of the territory… shall ever secede from the Union.”65 
Even before the removal of the secession provision, the central government was actively 
combating almost 20 ethnic separatist groups numbering over 60,000 armed insurgents.66 
Some of these groups never moved for secession under the original constitution, choosing 
rather to engage in armed insurrection against the central government.67 When the central 
government denied another group their constitutional right to secede and then attempted to 
install Buddhism as the state religion, several other groups joined the armed insurgency.68 In 
response, the central government began making agreements with the groups, granting them 
economic and local control.69 
                                                          
61 1947 Const. of Myan. art. 10 (Myan.). 
62 Human Rights Watch, Chronology of Burma’s Constitutional Process, available at 
http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/burma0508chronology.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2014). 
63 Id. 
64 1974 Const. of Myan. (Myan.) 
65 2008 Const. of Myan., art. 10 (Myan.) 
66 Renaud Egreteau, Case Study 5: Myanmar/Burma: Secession and the Ethnic Conundrum in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Secession, 475, 475 (Peter Radan, Aleksandar Pavkovic ed., 2011). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
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Since the 2010 elections, Burma has been under a democratic parliamentarian 
government, however, the military guaranteed their continued influence by reserving 25% of 
parliament seats for military appointment.70 Under this system, the government has continued 
its crackdown on activist and ethnic minorities.71 Several ethic insurgent groups are currently 
fighting against the central government for independence or increased autonomy.72  
Both China and Burma continue to face violent separatist movements.73 The conflicts 
with these groups have caused continued human rights concerns and have isolated both 
countries. The expressed denial of the right to secession has limited or nullified other 
constitutional protections.  
c. Implied 
 When the constitution is mute on secession, the issue is only addressed when a people 
within the state makes a claim for the right. Under the traditional view, the muteness negates 
the existence of a right to secession. Nonetheless, the modern application of this approach has 
recognized the right as long as it is accomplished within the legal framework of the 
constitution. For a better understanding of this approach, this section will look at the 
                                                          
70 Min Zin, Can Burma’s Civil Society Find Its Voice Again?, ForeignPolicy.com, (Nov. 26, 2014) available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/11/26/can-burmas-civil-society-find-its-voice-again/. 
71 John Sifton, Old Wars in New Burma, HuffingtonPost.com (Nov. 3, 2014) available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/john-sifton/old-wars-in-the-new-burma_b_6096018.html 
72 Id. 
73 See, Elizabeth Van Wie Davis, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies, Uyghur Muslim Ethnic Separatism in 
Xinjiang, China (Jan. 2008) available at http://www.apcss.org/college/publications/uyghur-muslim-ethnic-
separatism-in-xinjiang-china; See also, John Sifton, supra note 71 
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movements in Quebec and Scotland and how the domestic democratic process not only 
recognized, but encouraged self-determination. 
QUEBEC 
 The Quebec movement, much like the Flemish is rooted in linguistic and economic 
concerns.74 As a whole, Canada is mainly an English speaking nation, with 90% of the population 
speaking English.75 However, in Quebec, 81% of the population speaks French.76 The language 
distinction carries over into cultural and religious aspects, with English Canadians being 
predominantly Protestant and French Canadians being Catholic.77 French Canadians have 
continuously taken steps to protect their unique culture and ensure economic equality.78  
 There have been two referendums on Quebec’s independence, one in 1980 and another 
in 1995, both of which failed.79 Following the 1980 referendum, substantial changes were made 
to the Canadian Constitution.80 These revisions curtailed some of Quebec’s powers and did not 
provide a means for Quebec to opt out of the amendments.81 However, Quebec has yet to 
                                                          
74 Rudy Fenwick, Social Change and Ethnic Nationalism: An Historical Analysis of the Separatist Movement in 
Quebec, 23 Comparative Studies in Society and History, 196, 199 (1981). 
75 Id. 
76 Id.  
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 196 
79 Montserrat Guiberran, Francois Rocher, & Elisenda Casanas Adam, Introduction: A Special Section on Self-
Determination and the Use of Referendums: Catalonia, Quebec and Scotland, 27 Int. J. Polit. Cult. Soc., 1 (2014).  
80 Id. at 2. 
81 Office of the Minister Responsible for Canadian Intergovernmental Affairs, Quebec’s Political and Constitutional 
Status; An Overview, 20 (1999). 
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ratify these revisions.82 The 1995 referendum was followed by case before the Supreme Court 
of Canada to determine the legality of unilateral secession by Quebec.83 
 In its opinion the Court found that a majority vote, no matter how large the majority, 
could have legal effect on its own.84 However, the Court also stated that the “constitutional 
order could not be indifferent to a clear expression of a clear majority of Quebecers that they 
no longer wish to remain in Canada.”85 While refusing to define the process, the Court did hold 
that negotiations addressing the other provinces, minorities (both inside and outside of 
Quebec), and Canada as a whole would be required for secession to follow the rule of law and 
have effect under the constitution.86 In spite of these events, the Quebec movement remains a 
peaceful democratic movement aimed at the realization of self-determination. 
SCOTLAND 
 The democratic process exercised by Scotland and the United Kingdom provides a 
functional model of an implied right of secession. Unlike Quebec, Scotland was an independent 
state until 1707 when it entered into the Treaty of Union with England.87 Under the treaty, 
Scotland’s parliament was dissolved, but it retained its legal, education, and social welfare 
programs as well as its own church.88  
                                                          
82 Gregory Millard, Secession and Self: Quebec in Canadian Thought, 94 (McGill-Queen’s University Press 2008). 
83 Montserrat Guiberran, Francois Rocher, & Elisenda Casanas Adam, supra note 79, at 2. 
84 Reference re Secession of Quebec [1998], 2 S.C.R. 217 (Can.). 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Christopher K. Connolly, supra at 60. 
88 Id.  
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 Scotland and the United Kingdom mutually benefited from this arrangement with little 
challenges to the status quo until the Labour Party began working towards devolution in the 
1970’s.89 In 1998, the Scotland Act was introduced, which reinstated a local Scottish 
parliament.90 In 2012, Alex Salmond, the leader of the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) 
announced plans to hold a referendum on independence in 2014.91 The Edinburgh Agreement 
of 2012 ensured that this referendum would take place and would be effective under the rule 
of law.92 The referendum was held September 19, 2014, but failed to achieve the majority vote 
required. However, a proposed deal between Scotland and the United Kingdom was reached on 
November 27, 2014 that could greatly increase Scotland’s power to raise and spend funds.93 At 
the time of this writing, a vote has not been held, however, it has been reported to have the 
backing of “major political leaders” on both sides.94  
 Through effective use of the democratic process and the rule of law, Scotland and 
Canada have been able to avoid violent protest. The frameworks provided for each movement 
clearly established how the struggle for independence would be fought. And through this 
framework, the secessionist in each movement continue to work towards a peaceful realization 
of their right to self-determination. 
                                                          
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 61  
91 Id.  
92 Agreement between the United Kingdom Government and the Scottish Government on a referendum on 
independence for Scotland, Scot.-U.K., Oct. 15, 2012, [hereinafter Edinburgh Agreement] 
93 Stephen Castle, Panel Details Plan to Give Scotland More Powers, New York Times, (Nov. 27, 2014) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/28/world/europe/scotland-should-get-increased-powers-including-over-
taxation-commission-says.html?_r=0. 
94 Id.  
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III. Which Approach If Any? 
 Any approach adopted must recognize the principle of self-determination, while 
balancing the principle of territorial integrity. Further, a good model would appreciate the 
impact a constitutional provision on secession can have on domestic affairs. Consent of the 
people seeking secession and that of the host state are important to consider in this analysis.95 
Finally, it must include a democratic process that is attainable. The standard should not be so 
low to allow a splintering of the state, but at the same time, it should not be so high or 
burdensome that it defeats the purpose of the provision.96 
d. Proposed Model  
One could create a workable constitutional provision, by borrowing from the Ethiopian 
framework and the Canadian process. But first, a working definition of “peoples” must be 
ascertained in order to determine who could hold a right of self-determination under 
international law. It must also be determined if this right will be subjected to some sort of 
qualifying “triggering” condition. 
The United Nations Educational, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) defined a 
“people” as a group holding some if not all of the following common features: 
1. Common historical tradition; 
2. Racial or ethnic identity; 
3. Cultural homogeneity; 
4. Linguistic unity; 
5. Religious or ideological affinity; 
                                                          
95 Peter Radan, Secession in Constitutional Law in The Ashgate Research Companion to Secession, 333, 342 
(Aleksandar Pavkovic ed., 2011). 
96 Susanna Mancini supra note 29 at 580. 
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6. Territorial connection; and 
7. Common economic life.97 
UNESCO further stated “the group must be of a certain number” that is “more than a mere 
association of individuals within a State.”98 As well as “the will to be identified as a people or 
the consciousness of being a people – allowing that groups or some members of such groups… 
may not have that will or consciousness.”99 As a final element, “the group must have 
institutions or other means of expressing its common characteristics and will for identity.”100 
Based on this definition, the wording of “Nation, Nationality and People” found in Ethiopia 
would be unnecessarily cumulative for the purposes of this essay. A “people” under UNESCO 
would easily qualify as a nation or nationality. Since a “people” will be moving for secession, the 
group should also meet the first three qualifications of a state found in the Convention on 
Rights and Duties of States. These qualifications are a permanent population, a defined 
territory, and a government.101 
 While there should be some qualifying measures for who can secede, it should not 
reach the level of remedial secession, or a last resort provision. If the standard is too low it 
could lead to destabilization. However, if the standard is set too high the constitutional 
provision would be moot as unattainable.102 There must be a level that looks for discrimination, 
violation of rights (civil and/or human), or denial of internal self-determination, while also 
                                                          
97International Meeting of Experts on Further Study of the Concept of the Rights of Peoples, Final Report and 
Recommendations, UNESCO, Paris, Nov. 27-30, 1989, SHS-89/CONF.602/7 23, available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/OOO8/O0O851/085152eo.pdf (last visited Dec. 10, 2014). 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
101 The Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States art. 1, Dec. 26, 1933, 165 L.N.T.S. 19 (1933) 
[hereinafter Montevideo Convention]. 
102 Susanna Mancini, supra note 29 at 580. 
19 
 
acknowledging that some movements can be obtained through mutual agreement in the 
absence of any unjust actions on the part of the state. 
  Now that “people” has been defined, it can be applied to the Ethiopian framework and 
the Canadian process. However, application presents four questions that must be addressed: 
1. who calls for the referendum;  
2. who can vote; 
3. how is the referendum worded; and,  
4. what type of majority will be required?103  
These questions will be addressed throughout the explanation of the proposed model.  
 Under the requirements outlined above, a people must have a government. This body 
representing the secessionist group must call for a referendum. This body should be 
representative of not just the group seeking secession, but all of the people living within the 
territory that is being sought. The Ethiopian standard of two-thirds majority of this 
governmental body will be maintained. 
 Next, rather than allowing the federal government to schedule the referendum anytime 
“within three years,” a three year “cool off” period would be required. As suggested by the 
Supreme Court of Canada, negotiations, aimed at achieving something less than secession, 
would be mandatory for the federal government and the group seeking secession.104 Only after 
a failure to reach a mutual solution should the referendum be brought to the ballot. 
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 Once the referendum is presented to the public, a clear majority of the population 
seeking secession must vote in favor of the referendum.105 All competent persons of the 
territory belonging to the group seeking secession should be allowed to vote in this 
referendum. A competent person is any person of voting age that is not precluded from voting 
because of a mental or health defect that would prevent him or her from appreciating the 
matter being voted on. No other restrictions should be applied. This will ensure that the will of 
the entire territory is known. Further the question presented in the referendum must clearly 
ask the voter “whether the territorial unit on which they live is to become a separate state.”106 
To be considered successful a referendum must have a voter turnout and positive vote 
significant enough to attribute legitimacy on the referendum. 
Upon a successful referendum, another round of negotiations would be held between 
the group seeking secession, federal government, and the groups not seeking secession. This 
round of negotiations would address the “potential act of secession,” the interests of all 
concerned groups, and the protection of the rights of minorities within the area seeking 
representation.107 Only after these negotiations should steps be taken towards the finalization 
of the secession.  
a. Application of This Model 
A constitutional approach to secession based on the above model “provides the best 
means of averting the worst dangers and excess.”108 The introduction of such a provision would 
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subject an extremely delicate process to the rules of democratic logic and enable forms of 
external control over the whole process” therefore ensuring that secessionist do not “pursue 
their goals in the absence of rules.109 As stated by the Supreme Court of Canada, “the clear 
expression of the desire to pursue secession by the population of a province would give rise to 
a reciprocal obligation on all parties to Confederation to negotiate constitutional changes.”110 
Further, a movement for secession carried out under such a model would be more likely to be 
accepted by the international community.111  
When compared to current models of internal self-determination, secession through a 
democratic process does more for stability and national identity. The modern trend is towards 
“a quasi-federalist” model, where minorities are given some level of territorial autonomy.112 
This trend highlights rather than reduces ethnocentric or other divisive ideas.113 Under the 
quasi-federal model, minorities groups are forced to live separately in order to maintain control 
over their culture, language, and other ethnic ideas. This leads autonomous regions to pursue 
more power from the central government.114 The federal government gives up more and more 
of its power, relying instead on the minority entities to address the local needs and issues 
specific to their group.115 As seen in Belgium, this model does little to establish a national 
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identity and only increases the ethical, cultural, or linguistic divides between the different 
groups.116 
By including such a provision, the constitution can actively protect the stability of a state 
and minority civil and human rights. A constitutional provision on secession motivates the 
majority groups to work with minorities and to honor their obligations under international and 
domestic law. This motivation to collaborate with minority groups would be an effective 
method of protecting minority groups from civil and human rights violations. When faced with 
separatist movements, governments may begin to give incentives to rectify some of the 
grievances, rather than launching campaigns to suppress the movements.117 
This model is not without its own dangers. First, a government that has actively 
exploited a group or violated a group’s basic rights is not likely to give up its control over them. 
The current situation in Ethiopia is a prime example of this danger.118 Ethiopia has the broadest 
constitutional provision on secession, yet the federal government and police are continuously 
taking measures to suppress secession movements from ethnic organizations.119  
Second, the existence of a provision on secession can be exploited by either the 
government or minority groups to extract concessions from the other side. This exploitation has 
been seen repeatedly during periods of nation building.120 Many developing governments have 
held out a provision on secession to encourage groups and other states to submit to the 
                                                          
116 Id. at 576. 
117 David D. Speetzen and Christopher Heath Wellman, Choice Theories of Secession in The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Secession, 413, 423 (Peter Radan, Aleksandar Pavkovic ed., 2011). 
118 Alem Habtu, supra note 36 at 329. 
119 Id. 
120 Susanna Mancini, supra note 29 at 567. 
23 
 
emerging government. Recall, for example, that China’s 1931 Constitution included a right to 
secession. However, after the Communist Party solidified control over mainland China and 
areas like Tibet, a new constitution declared inalienability of territory. This process was also 
employed in Burma between the 1947 and 1974 Constitutions. This fear was also expressed 
when the exit option was included in the European Constitutional treaty.121 The article was 
seen as a method for Member States to force the hand of the Union and a possible threat to 
stability.122 
Another fear presented by critics of constitution secession is that governments will be 
less willing to decentralize the government. This would result in reducing the about of 
autonomy held by minority groups.123 This could also lead to governments becoming 
increasingly oppressive of cultural diversity in an attempt to counter regional or ethnical 
aspirations of autonomy or statehood.124  
However, all of these concerns can be rebutted. International law requires States to 
protect minority rights and internal self-determination. There is some support for the notion 
that systematic violations of human rights and denial of internal self-determination can give 
rise to a “claim of external self-determination or separation from the State.”125 When a state’s 
actions reach this level, the consequences are greater than just internal instability. Under these 
situations, a state faces isolation, diplomatic pressure, and possible United Nations action.  
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The idea that minority groups can coerce the government can be flipped on its head and 
viewed as a method to protect the minority groups from coercion by the dominating group or 
government. This is easily seen in authoritarian states like China and Burma. However, even in 
states that have all the elements of democracy and fairness, minority groups are exposed to 
domination by a more powerful group.  
Our own history offers an indisputable illustration of this concern. Following the Civil 
War, widespread gerrymandering ensured that African Americans would be under-represented 
in both Congress and state legislatures.126 At the same time municipal elections were switched 
from local-ward based elections to at-large elections. This increased the cost of elections and 
made African American candidates dependent on white voters.127 More common practices 
include ballot access regulations, personal campaign contribution requirements, and 
fundraising regulations.128 While these practices are justified as being neutral and 
administrative in nature, they still have the effect of maintaining domination.129 Under this 
view, it is easy to view the threat of secession as defense mechanism rather than one of 
coercion. 
IV. Conclusion 
While a constitutional provision on secession has not been completely successful in 
under minding separatist movements, it has been shown that they can reduce the risk of 
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violence and human rights violations. If a model that is based on the rule of law, aimed at 
protecting minorities as well as maintaining the State can successfully be implemented, the 
nature of many of the world’s separatist movements may also evolve. Global views on 
democracy and a movement away from territory being unavoidable is needed before this 
model could have any effect. Further, any country that implements this type of provision must 
be one that is committed to civil, political, and human rights, a country that unfortunately does 
not exist at this time. 
